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Abstract
This paper extends the literature on the determinants of international activity at the 
ﬁ  rm level towards cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁ  eld investments as diﬀ  erent 
modes of FDI using a rich dataset of British ﬁ  rms. While multinational ﬁ  rms are 
characterized by higher productivity levels than exporters on average, the productivity 
ranking predicted by Helpman et al. (2004) does not hold within all types of industries 
and across all modes of foreign direct investment. In line with Nocke & Yeaple (2007) 
it matters whether multinational ﬁ  rms engage abroad via greenﬁ  eld investments or 
cross-border acquisitions. Cross-border deals involve the most productive ﬁ   rms in 
sectors with a high share of intangible assets, but the least productive group of all 
internationally active ﬁ  rms in other industries.
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This paper adds to the empirical literature on the determinants of international activity at the
ﬁrm level. In particular, it analyzes the sorting pattern of ﬁrms into different modes of foreign
market entry depending on their productivity level with a focus on two different types of FDI,
namely greenﬁeld entry and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The contribution of
the present paper is to test for the ﬁrst time the productivity ranking of internationally active
ﬁrms established in the theoretical model by Nocke & Yeaple (2007). The results show that FDI
does not always involve the most productive ﬁrms within a sector as soon as it is accounted for
the different modes of foreign investments. Thus, the paper provides new empirical evidence on
the Helpman et al. (2004) predictions that hold on average, but not across all types of FDI and
not within all sectors. For productivity comparisons it matters whether MNEs engage abroad via
greenﬁeld investments or cross-border acquisitions.
Helpman et al. (2004) provide a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms in an industry that decide
whether to serve the foreign market either through exports or to engage in FDI. Firms that want
to build a foreign afﬁliate have to incur set-up costs that are higher than the ﬁxed costs of ex-
porting, but they save on per unit transportation costs. The implied proximity-concentration
trade-off between producing closer to the consumer and producing with higher economies of
scale leads to a speciﬁc productivity ranking of ﬁrms in an industry: only the most productive
ﬁrms decide to invest abroad, while less efﬁcient ﬁrms serve the foreign market via exports as
illustrated schematically in ﬁgure 1. In this context, Helpman et al. (2004) refer to greenﬁeld
investments only, where a new ﬁrm is set-up abroad, while the alternative entry via cross-border
acquisitions of existing ﬁrms is neglected (Neary, 2009).1 More recently, the attention shifted
to the composition of FDI with regard to the particular form of market entry. Different reasons
arise for ﬁrms to choose either greenﬁeld entry or cross-border acquisitions. Apart from strate-
gic considerations – greenﬁeld investments add a new ﬁrm to the foreign market, whereas an
acquisition can be thought of as a change in ownership (Markusen & Stähler, 2009; Görg, 2000)
– one important difference is the acquisition of complementary assets.
ThismotiveiswellknownintheM&Aliterature(see, forexample,Jovanovic&Braguinsky,
2004), and empirical evidence shows that it is particularly relevant for cross-border acquisitions,
1Furthermore, the primary motivation of ﬁrms to invest abroad is market access. This horizontal type
of FDI refers to a duplication of the domestic production process abroad in order to serve the foreign
market locally, thereby substituting exports (in the spirit of Markusen, 1984; Brainard, 1997). Vertical
FDI, in contrast, transfers parts of the ﬁrm’s production process into another country to exploit existing
cross-country cost diﬀerences, thus resulting in increased intra-ﬁrm trade (such as analyzed in Helpman,
1984; Alfaro & Charlton, 2009).
4while it plays a minor role for domestic deals (Frey & Hussinger, 2006). This is plausible if one
thinks of parts of a ﬁrm’s stock of knowledge to be market speciﬁc. The acquisition of a foreign
target ﬁrm provides a way to gain access to these valuable assets and knowledge at the cost of
the acquisition price. In contrast, MNEs choosing greenﬁeld entry use their own technology
both at home and abroad. Given this key difference in the nature of the two entry modes, the
characteristics of ﬁrms engaging in either one can be expected to vary as well.
The latter distinction is picked up in the theoretical model of Nocke & Yeaple (2007) that
analyzes the choice between three foreign entry modes: exporting, cross-border M&A, and
greenﬁeld investment.2 Not only are ﬁrms modeled to be heterogeneous with respect to their
productivity, but in addition sectors differ regarding the underlying source of the observed pro-
ductivity differences. In one sector, ﬁrms display productivity differences mainly due to an
internationally mobile capability, while more market-speciﬁc assets drive the heterogeneity of
ﬁrms in the other industry. Depending on whether immobile or mobile capabilities determine
ﬁrm heterogeneity within a certain industry, a different subset of ﬁrms decide to use a speciﬁc
foreign entry mode. The known proximity-concentration trade-off still is at work in both types
of industries so that more productive ﬁrms always prefer greenﬁeld investment over exports. The
group of ﬁrms that decides to acquire a foreign target ﬁrm, however, varies across the two types
of industries. The interplay between the ﬁrms’ capabilities, the importance of either capability in
the sector, and the acquisition price that is set in the merger market determines whether the most
or least productive ﬁrms of all internationally active ﬁrms engage in a cross-border acquisition.
The most efﬁcient ﬁrms acquire an existing foreign ﬁrm whenever the underlying source of
the ﬁrm heterogeneity is easily transferred to foreign countries. Those ﬁrms seek to combine
their own exceptional mobile assets with complementary foreign market-speciﬁc know-how to
be able to exploit their productivity advantage abroad. The predicted productivity ranking im-
plies the known sorting pattern of MNEs, exporters, and domestic ﬁrms, whereby those ﬁrms
choosing greenﬁeld investments are in between the productivity levels of acquirers and export-
ing ﬁrms. The described ranking is sketched in the second line of ﬁgure 1. If the relevant
determinant of productivity advantages is less mobile across borders, however, the productivity
ordering is partly reversed: in this case, ﬁrms with the lowest productivity of all internationally
active ﬁrms acquire an existing foreign ﬁrm, while the most efﬁcient ﬁrms engage in greenﬁeld
investments. For ﬁrms with the best immobile, more market-speciﬁc capabilities, it does not pay
off to costly acquire the knowledge of the local ﬁrm as their productivity advantage is strong
enough to compensate for its reduced effectiveness in the foreign market. The least productive
2Eicher & Kang (2005) also analyze these three entry modes, they focus on country and market
characteristics and do not include ﬁrm heterogeneity.
5ﬁrms, in contrast, need to acquire a foreign ﬁrm to be able to compete in the foreign market at
all. In contrast to Helpman et al. (2004), FDI does not always involve the most productive ﬁrms
if the entry mode is taken into account. The third line of ﬁgure 1 corresponds to this prediction.
Although the literature started to emphasize cross-border M&As and greenﬁeld investments
as two distinct modes of FDI recently (Nocke & Yeaple, 2008; Neary, 2009; Stiebale & Trax,
2011), empirical evidence is still rather scarce. Several empirical studies report a productivity
advantage of established MNEs over exporters (Greenaway & Kneller, 2007; Tomiura, 2007;
Arnold & Hussinger, 2010), with some evidence that large and more productive ﬁrms self-select
to become MNEs (Girma et al., 2005; Jäckle & Wamser, 2010; Damijan et al., 2007). To the best
of my knowledge there is no study that takes into account the two modes of FDI in addition to the
ﬁrms’ exporting decision with an explicit differentiation of mobile and non-mobile industries.
Nocke & Yeaple (2008) ﬁnd ﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld investments to be signiﬁcantly more
productive compared to acquirers in cross-border deals. However, exporting as a third mode of
foreign market entry is not considered. In Raff et al. (2008), even more variations of possible
entry modes are considered (wholly-owned versus jointly owned afﬁliates) analyzing a Japanese
dataset. Without considering industry differences, the authors also ﬁnd more productive ﬁrms to
prefer greenﬁeld investments over cross-border acquisitions.3
However, understanding which ﬁrms of an industry choose a certain foreign entry mode
is important for several reasons. The effects of cross-border investments on the investing and
competing ﬁrms probably depend on whether the most or less productive ﬁrms typically try to
acquire a target ﬁrm abroad or plan to build up a new ﬁrm. Often discussed spillover effects of
foreign entry, for example, might be contingent on the investors own productivity level (Keller,
2004; Javorcik, 2004). In addition, as shown by Nocke & Yeaple (2007), theoretical predictions
regarding the effects of trade liberalization on average industry productivity and on production
reallocations between ﬁrms crucially depend on the mapping from the ﬁrms’ productivity to
their internationalization choice. Finally, although cross-border investments are an even rarer
ﬁrm activity than exporting, their relative impact across economies is huge (compare Bernard
et al., 2007): In 2007, the UNCTAD’s (2010) World Investment Report counted 7,018 deals and
12,210 greenﬁeld investments worldwide. At the same time, M&As were shown to be a poten-
tially important channel for industry restructuring and asset reallocation after periods of trade
liberalizations (Neary, 2007; Bertrand & Zitouna, 2006; Breinlich, 2008). In fact, transaction
3There is more empirical work on the choice between greenﬁeld investment and cross-border acquisi-
tions such as Andersson & Svensson (1994). They usually focus on the inﬂuence of country and industry
characteristics though and do not look at ﬁrm productivity.
6values involved in cross-border deals are extremely high: the total value of worldwide cross-
border M&As amounted to over one trillion US dollars and accounted as such for over half of
the value of global FDI ﬂows at their latest peak in the year 2007.
Using a large ﬁrm-level panel data set of British ﬁrms, I am able to deﬁne the two types of
foreign investment. The panel structure of the data allows to analyze productivity differences
before the actual foreign market entry to separate the selection mechanism from the reverse
effects of international activity on the ﬁrms’ productivity. The distinction of the two industry
types is operationalized using the share of intangible assets over non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets. I
argue that industries with a high share of intangible assets can be interpreted as sectors where
the ﬁrms’ productivity advantage is based on mobile capabilities, as those intangibles can be
combined with local assets in all parts of the ﬁrm simultaneously. Industries displaying a lower
share are classiﬁed as non-mobile. For manufacturing ﬁrms, an additional classiﬁcation is used.
Industries with a high share of R&D expenditures relative to industry sales are deﬁned as the
sector with relatively mobile technological know-how, while industries with a pronounced share
of advertising expenses approximate the sector with less mobile marketing knowledge.
Considering acquirers of foreign ﬁrms and ﬁrms that build up a new afﬁliate abroad sepa-
rately reveals considerable heterogeneity across modes of FDI and between industries. In line
with theoretical predictions by Nocke & Yeaple (2007), acquirers in cross-border deals are the
most productive ﬁrms in sectors with a high share of intangibles, but they are the least pro-
ductive group of all internationally active ﬁrms in the complementary low intangibles industry
group. Not all future MNEs are necessarily more productive than exporters if the type of FDI
and industry are taken into account. The speciﬁc source for the industries’ high intangible assets
seems to matter less, as cross-border acquirers are the most productive ﬁrms both in R&D and
advertising-intensive manufacturing industries.
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, I present the data and variable deﬁnitions,
while section 3 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 contains the results. Section 5 is
devoted to several robustness checks, the last section concludes the paper.
2 Data
The analysis is based on a comprehensive ﬁrm-level data set that is constructed combining ﬁ-
nancial data and ownership information for European ﬁrms with a global M&A database that
allows for the distinction between the two modes of foreign direct investment.
The ﬁnancial data is taken from the Amadeus database published by Bureau van Dijk, which
provides information on ﬁrms’ balance sheets, and proﬁt and loss accounts for up to ten years.
7The data is collected from company reports that are supplemented by specialized regional in-
formation providers. A fundamental feature of the data is the availability of unconsolidated
accounts that display balance sheet items separately for the single enterprise in contrast to the
whole corporate group. Combining eight consecutive updates of the Amadeus database for the
years 2000-2007, I have yearly data on the number of foreign subsidiaries of each ﬁrm.4 I merge
the observations from Amadeus with the transaction data from the Zephyr database, an M&A
database from the same provider. Zephyr includes data on M&As, IPOs, joint ventures, and
private equity transactions and provides information about date and value of a deal, as well as
identiﬁers for the ﬁrms involved in the deal.
The data structure of this new combined European ﬁrm level data set allows for the necessary
differentiation between cross-border M&As and greenﬁeld investments and the reconstruction
of the growing international commitment of ﬁrms over time. The exact number of cross-border
deals is extracted from the Zephyr data. The information for greenﬁeld projects has to be ap-
proximated: Subtracting the number of cross-border deals per year and ﬁrm from the change
in the reported number of foreign subsidiaries between two years given in the Amadeus data,
I deﬁne greenﬁeld investments as a residual category. I concentrate on investments where the
acquirer gains at least a majority interest in the target ﬁrm as it is usual in the M&A literature.5
The approximation of greenﬁeld investments suffers from two potential inaccuracies. Al-
though the quality of the M&A database is high, for some deals not all necessary information is
reported. In those cases, the generated value for greenﬁeld investment would be too high when
the resulting afﬁliate is reported in Amadeus. This should be a minor problem, however, as the
two datasets origin from the same data provider, so that all relevant data for the deal should
be available if the afﬁliate is reported in Amadeus.6 The ﬁgures on greenﬁeld investments are
downward biased, on the other hand, whenever a ﬁrm closes or sells previously acquired ﬁrms
within one year. If these measurement errors would be too strong, they could blur the classiﬁ-
cation of the two types of investment. The observed difference in the productivity levels should
then be biased if anything towards zero.
The main variable of interest is the ﬁrms’ efﬁciency. A frequently used measure of a ﬁrm’s
productivity level is the total factor productivity (TFP) calculated as the residual of a production
4Each update of Amadeus provides information on subsidiaries for one point in time only.
5Most deals are majority acquisitions or even full acquisitions. The remaining small part of deals
results from share buyback activities involving increases in the stake hold of only few percentage points.
6Comparing aggregate statistics derived from the Zephyr database with those from Thompson ﬁnan-
cial data as used in Brakman et al. (2007), the coverage of transactions with a deal value above 10 million
US$ appears to be very similar.
8function estimation. I implement Olley & Pakes’ (1996) estimation algorithm that uses invest-
ments to control for unobserved productivity shocks that induce a simultaneity problem in the
TFP estimation and that also controls for ﬁrm exit.7 I calculate TFP for all observations with
sales, labor, and capital ﬁgures available. Alternative productivity measures are discussed in the
robustness section.
Next, I deﬁne exporters in a comparable way to cross-border acquisition and greenﬁeld
investment measures. Thinking about FDI, a crucial distinction is between the stock or ﬂow
of FDI. The former is the amount already invested abroad, while the latter refers to the change
in the stock of FDI. Cross-border M&As and greenﬁeld investments can be interpreted as ﬂow
variables as they reﬂect additional investment abroad, whereas the number of foreign afﬁliates
corresponds to the stock of FDI. The best approach to generate a comparable ﬂow measure
of exports would be to look at exports to a new market or region. As this information is not
available in the dataset, I generate a variable that is equal to one if a ﬁrm increases signiﬁcantly
its export turnover (export turnover grows more than 50%).
For the estimation sample, British ﬁrms are selected, as the data availability is particularly
high and the United Kingdom is one of the countries worldwide with the most acquirers in cross-
border deals (Brakman et al., 2007). Only ﬁrms for which unconsolidated balance sheet data are
available are included. Firms that are active in the primary sector, holding companies (NACE
code 7415), and ﬁrms from the public sector (NACE 75, 91) are deleted. I exclude ﬁnancial
companies (NACE 65-67) as the deﬁnition of output or sales and hence any measure of total
factor productivity is not comparable to other ﬁrms. Inspecting the growth rates of variables like
ﬁrm size and number of employees, I delete large outliers at both ends of the distribution as they
could indicate an unreported merger. After applying standard cleaning procedures,8 I am left
with 249,014 ﬁrm-year observations.
3 Estimation
Therearetwocommonlyusedapproachestomeasuretheproductivitydifferencesbetweenﬁrms.
One strategy is to test for differences in the productivity distributions between groups of ﬁrms
in the spirit of Delgado et al. (2002) and Girma et al. (2005), the other consists of regressing a
productivity measure on internationalization dummies as in Bernard & Jensen (1999) and Head
7The alternative estimation strategy using material inputs instead of investments as suggested in
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) is not an option as this variable is not available for the UK.
8Deletion of observations with implausible values such as negative input factors or intangible assets
ratios above one, and with growth rates larger than the highest and smaller than the ﬁrst 200-quantile.
9& Ries (2003). Following the latter approach, I estimate the following equation separately for
each industry:
𝑙𝑛(TFP𝑖𝑡)=𝗼0 + 𝗼𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝗼𝐶𝐵𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝗼𝐺𝐼𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝗽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽𝐶𝐵𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽𝐺𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝑪???? + 𝗾𝑗 + 𝗾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1)
where 𝑋 refers to exporters, 𝐶𝐵 to acquirers in a cross-border deal and 𝐺𝐼 to ﬁrms engaged
in greenﬁeld investment. Theses variables deﬁne ﬁrms who have already used the respective
entry mode within the last three years. In combination with the preﬁx ‘future’, the variables
refer to ﬁrms that currently do not but that are going to use the speciﬁc entry mode within
the next three years. Including these two sets of variables allows to separate the productivity
differential before the actual foreign market entry from potential productivity effects after the
ﬁrm has entered the foreign market. The estimated coefﬁcients 𝗼𝑘 of the internationalization
dummies reﬂect the productivity advantage of the group of ﬁrms that is going to choose the
respective internationalization strategy compared to ﬁrms that will not use the respective entry
mode given other international activities. To see whether ﬁrms of group 𝑘 are more or less
productivethanﬁrmsingroup𝑙, two-sidedt-testsofthefollowingnullhypothesisareperformed:
𝐻0 : 𝗼𝑙 − 𝗼𝑘 =0 , (2)
where 𝗼𝑘 and 𝗼𝑙 are the estimated coefﬁcients and 𝑘,𝑙 ∈{ 𝑋,𝐶𝐵,𝐺𝐼}.
𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a set of control variables. The log of the number of employees as well as its square
and the ﬁrms’ capital stock are included as measures of ﬁrm size, the log average wage accounts
for the composition of the labor force, and the age of a ﬁrm and its square are included to
reﬂect learning effects. In addition, I control for foreign majority shareholders as foreign owned
ﬁrms usually have a productivity advantage over domestically owned ﬁrms (Harris & Robinson,
2003); a further dummy identiﬁes public companies (Harhoff et al., 1998). 𝗾𝑗 refers to a set
of industry dummies at the two-digit NACE level, as productivity comparisons are meaningful
only within industries, and they capture industry characteristics that could inﬂuence the entry
mode choice. 𝗾𝑡 stands for a set of time dummies to account for macroeconomic circumstances.
Given the panel structure of the model, standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level to correct
for intra-group correlated standard errors.
The chosen approach is clearly descriptive in nature and does not claim a causal interpreta-
tion. In the literature that compares exporters with non-exporters, several estimation methods for
the identiﬁcation of productivity as a causal factor have been applied that could be extended in
10principletoincludeMNEs.9 Themaindifﬁcultyofsuchalternativeapproacheslike, forinstance,
a multinomial choice model, lies in the construction of mutually exclusive categories of ﬁrms ac-
cording to their internationalization status. Considering all possible combinations, I would have
to build six categories when introducing the two types of FDI.10 The number of observations in
some industries for some of these categories would be too low to achieve stable estimates. In
addition, another advantage of the chosen regression framework is the possibility to control for
all potential combinations of past international experience and the various internationalization
patterns. Thus, I can analyze the selection of ﬁrms into the respective internationalization modes
without restricting the analysis to future international and current domestic ﬁrms. The results
of Andersson & Svensson (1994), for example, indicate that the probability to choose a certain
FDI mode might depend on the existing international experience of the ﬁrm. A restricted sample
would probably be highly selective and additionally reduce the number of observations of future
cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld investments drastically.
The next step consists in ﬁnding an appropriate industry classiﬁcation that deﬁnes industries
with mobile and non-mobile capabilities. Nocke & Yeaple (2007) themselves provide concrete
examples for the concept of mobile and immobile capabilities that determine the different selec-
tion patterns across industries. Marketing expertise is of less value abroad as market conditions
differ and existing relationships to market participants provide an advantage in the home market
only. Such knowledge thus can be interpreted as immobile across countries. A ﬁrm’s production
technology, on the other hand, can be transferred relatively easily across borders without losing
its effectiveness. The operationalization of these capabilities is not straightforward, though.
The balance sheet data at hand is not detailed enough to include marketing expenditure or a
similar measure for the importance of immobile capabilities. I also do not have a direct measure
of ﬁrms’ R&D efforts or R&D output to approximate technology-intensive industries. Searching
for industry data from other sources, it appears to be difﬁcult to ﬁnd data at the appropriately
detailed level for all industries.
Therefore, I suggest a different measure for mobile capabilities that is directly observable in
the data, which is the share of intangible assets relative to the ﬁrm’s non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets. At
ﬁrst sight, this does not seem to be a direct implementation of the theoretical distinction. Nocke
9An example from the exporting literature is Bernard & Jensen (2004), who derive an estimable
equation of the export decision including past export status and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in order to account
for entry costs of exporting and unobserved heterogeneity.
10The categories would be: domestic ﬁrms, exporters only, exporters and cross-border acquirers, ex-
porters and ﬁrms engaged abroad via greenﬁeld investments, ﬁrms without exports, but with both types
of FDI, and ﬁnally ﬁrms that choose all three modes of foreign market entry.
11& Yeaple (2007) clearly describe that intangible assets determine the heterogeneity between
ﬁrms, but they want to stress the different types of intangible assets. According to international
accounting standards patents, licenses, and computer software are listed as intangible assets,
but also customer lists and supplier relationships. However, as the most important feature that
distinguishes the ﬁrms’ different assets is whether they can easily be transfered to another ﬁrm,
intangible assets might capture this distinction quite well as they form exactly that part of ﬁrms’
assets that can be employed simultaneously in more than one location. Combined with the for-
eign market-speciﬁc assets of the target ﬁrm, the described complementarities can be exploited.
Hence, I rank the two-digit NACE industries according to their mean intangible assets ratio.
The top quartile of all industries is labeled ‘High intangibles industry’. The resulting industry
should correspond to the sector with mobile capabilities. The complementary category ‘Low
intangibles industry’ subsumes the rest of all industries, as a proxy for the sector in which non-
mobile capabilities are the relevant source of heterogeneity in the ﬁrms’ productivity. Manu-
facturing of tobacco products, and research and development (NACE 16 and 73) are examples
from the manufacturing and service sector, respectively, for the former. Manufacturing of plastic
products or real estate activities (NACE 21 and 70), for instance, belong to the low-intangibles
group. The list of industries in the two categories is given in table 1. Alternative industry classi-
ﬁcations are considered as robustness checks in section 5.
4 Results
Before looking at the results of the regression analysis, some descriptive facts are presented.
Table 2 displays the share of ﬁrms with different internationalization statuses. Note that some
ﬁrms may be included in more than one category. In the dataset, 11.6% of all British ﬁrms in
the sample export. This is higher compared to numbers found for the U.S. (4% of all ﬁrms,
compare Bernard et al., 2007). This reﬂects the coverage of the dataset, which is very com-
prehensive for larger ﬁrms, while the smallest ﬁrms that are less likely to export are somewhat
underrepresented. The shares considering manufacturing ﬁrms only or excluding small ﬁrms
are even higher (37.4%) and similar to other studies for the U.K., illustrating the importance of
data selection (Girma et al., 2004, for example, report a share of 35%). The share of MNEs is
considerably smaller with only 1.9% of all ﬁrms and less than 5% even for large ﬁrms in the
manufacturing industry. Finally, the shares of cross-border acquirers and ﬁrms that engage in
greenﬁeld investment are shown. These shares are less than one percent of all ﬁrms with even
less acquirers than greenﬁeld investors.
Table 3 provides unconditional means of some ﬁrm characteristics in the estimation sample.
Domestic ﬁrms are smaller than exporters and those in turn are smaller than MNEs, both in
12terms of sales and employment. The difference between the two types of FDI ﬁrms is not very
pronounced. On average, exporters are as productive as cross-border acquirers, and both are
outperformed by ﬁrms engaged abroad via greenﬁeld investments. Interestingly, ﬁrms that have
acquired a foreign target display the highest average share of intangible investments, possibly
indicating the mentioned complementary-asset seeking motive.
The estimation results are presented in table 4. The estimated coefﬁcients of equation 1 are
shown in the upper panel separately for the low and high intangibles sector, while the statistics of
the tests on equality of the coefﬁcients are displayed below. In the regression for low intangibles
industries, future exporting ﬁrms display a medium productivity advantage of 7,2%. For green-
ﬁeld investors, the highest coefﬁcient shows up (13,1%). The cross-border acquirer coefﬁcient
is close to zero and not signiﬁcant at any reasonable level. The productivity differences between
groups are not statistically signiﬁcant, though, due to the high standard error of the cross-border
dummy, for which the number of ones is low. For the high intangibles sample, contrasting results
can be observed. Here, the group of future cross-border acquirers has the highest and the only
statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (44,3%), while the other two entry modes are not related to
a notable productivity advantage. The difference between exporters and greenﬁeld investors is
again not signiﬁcantly different from zero, but the null hypotheses of equality of coefﬁcients for
the comparisons with cross-border acquirers can be rejected at the 1% level. The results are in
line with the predictions of Nocke & Yeaple (2007), as the high intangibles sector corresponds
to the industry in which the ﬁrms’ heterogeneity is based on mobile capabilities, where the most
efﬁcient ﬁrms seek to aquire complementary assets abroad. The heterogeneity that shows up in
the results is hidden in studies ignoring industry differences and the composition of FDI.
Figure 2 visualizes the productivity differences. The upper graph shows the cumulative den-
sity functions of the ﬁrms’ productivity levels separately for each internationalization mode in
the low intangibles sector, the second graph refers to the high intangibles industry. Here, I do
not control for simultaneous use of more than one entry mode. Without testing formally for
stochastic dominance, inspecting the location of the productivity distributions of the various
entry modes gives a more complete picture of the productivity differences as a ranking of the
complete distributions is established. The productivity distributions of exporters and greenﬁeld
investors is located clearly to the right of the domestic ﬁrms’ line in both pictures, while the
productivity distribution of the two modes is very close to each other. The distribution for cross-
border acquirers in the low intangible industries is close to the distribution of exporters and
greenﬁeld investors and some quantiles are almost the same as the corresponding values for do-
mestic ﬁrms. This ﬁnding illustrates why no signiﬁcant productivity advantage of cross-border
acquirers could be found in the corresponding regression analysis. In the high intangibles sec-
13tor, in contrast, the productivity distribution of cross-border acquirers clearly dominates all other
distributions. In addition to the mean, every quantile of the cross-border acquirers’ productivity
distribution is the largest compared to the rest of the ﬁrms in the sample. The high coefﬁcient
in the regression approach seems not to arise due to inﬂuential observations but rather reﬂects
systematically higher productivity levels of cross-border acquirers in the mobile capabilities in-
dustry.
An important issue for the discussion is whether the results are sensitive towards the speciﬁc
sample or measurement. For this discussion it appears to be helpful to provide comparable
results with previous empirical work.
Table 5 therefore shows estimation results if the heterogeneity of FDI modes and industries
is neglected. Future MNEs are deﬁned as ﬁrms that are going to acquire an additional afﬁliate
in the upcoming three years. The results are similar to the existing literature, as future exporters
are more productive than domestic ﬁrms, and future MNEs display even higher productivity
levels (compare Arnold & Hussinger, 2010; Girma et al., 2004, for example). The difference
between the estimated coefﬁcients is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The known result that the most
productive ﬁrms become MNEs thus holds on average, but hides considerable heterogeneity in
the relation between a ﬁrm’s productivity and its mode of foreign entry.
5 Robustness checks
In the estimations presented so far, a vector of control variables was always included to ﬁlter
out the pure productivity differences. To show that none of the included ﬁrm characteristics
has a strong enough inﬂuence to wipe out the observed ranking, I estimate the raw productivity
differences between the groups. Therefore, only the post-entry dummies together with time and
industry dummies, but no controls for further ﬁrm characteristics are included in table 6. The
estimated coefﬁcients turn out to be larger in size, but the productivity ranking itself does not
change. All ﬁrms active in international markets turn out to be signiﬁcantly more productive
compared to their domestic counterparts, but partly only due to their size, skill structure, and
age. The productivity ranking of the groups of international ﬁrms using different entry modes is
not affected though.
Further, as the theoretical model strictly speaking refers to domestically owned ﬁrms only,
table 7 displays the results excluding ﬁrms with a majority foreign shareholder. The estimations
are again quite similar to the ﬁrst set of results. While foreign owned ﬁrms are known to be
more productive, this advantage seems not to be systematically related to the sorting of ﬁrms
into different internationalization strategies.
14Apart from the change in the estimation sample, I consider some changes in the variable
deﬁnitions. As described in the data section, the Olley & Pakes method used to construct a
consistent TFP measure takes care of some of the major estimation problems, nevertheless it
critically hinges on functional form restrictions and instrument variables. Therefore, I also use
labor productivity (total sales per employee) as an alternative productivity measure (table 8), the
residuals from a simple OLS estimation of a Cobb-Douglas type production function (table 9),
and estimates including ﬁrm ﬁxed effects (table 10).11 For these variations, I do not include
control variables as the results would be identical conditioning on labor and capital input. The
correlation between the various measures is always higher than 0.9, thus causing no signiﬁcant
change in the described results. The only exception is the latter version, where cross-border
acquirers have a higher coefﬁcient than exporters in the low intangible industry, however, the
difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
For reasons of comparability, in the baseline speciﬁcation the exporter variable is equal to
one if the share of turnover resulting from export activities increased signiﬁcantly. Table 11
recalculates the results for the usual stock deﬁnition. That is, the exporter dummy equals one
for ﬁrms that are going to export and zero otherwise. The coefﬁcients and test statistics again
almost do not change.
The next variations refer to alternatives to the chosen industry classiﬁcation. To check the
sensitivity of the results towards the grouping of the industries (top-quartile), I perform regres-
sions that include all industries and I interact all foreign entry dummy variables with the mean
industry share of intangibles.
𝑙𝑛(TFP𝑖𝑡)=𝗽0 + 𝗽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽𝐶𝐵𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽𝐺𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝗽𝑚𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑗
+ 𝗽𝑚𝐶𝐵𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑗 + 𝗽𝑚𝐺𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑚𝑗 + 𝜷𝑪???? + 𝗾𝑗 + 𝗾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3)
where 𝑚𝑗 is the mean share of intangible assets relative to non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets in a
two-digit NACE industry. In this estimation, the interaction between cross-border acquisitions
and the mean ratio of intangible assets should have a positive coefﬁcient, while the interaction
terms with greenﬁeld investments and exporters are expected to be insigniﬁcant. Table 12 gives
the respective estimates. The coefﬁcients on the pre-entry dummies are positive and signiﬁcant
for future exporters and greenﬁeld investors, while cross-border acquisitions are related to a
lower productivity. Looking at the interaction terms, however, the only positive, large, and
signiﬁcant effect is found for cross-border acquirers in line with expectations. To interpret the
11Another measure would be value added per employee; unfortunately, value added is rarely reported
for British ﬁrms.
15results in a meaningful way, the lowest and highest values for the mean share of intangibles
have to be considered to get the possible range of the effect. The lowest intangibles ratio is
1.3%, while the sector with the highest value reaches 11.2%. This results in a combined effect
between-0.245and0.578, implyingcross-borderacquirerstobetheleastproductiveﬁrmsinlow
intangibles industries, but they are the most productive ﬁrms in industries with high intangibles.
This alternative speciﬁcation thus again conﬁrms the theoretical predictions.
As a further robustness check, I consider manufacturing ﬁrms separately from the service
industries. As for many services a more direct customer-producer interaction is necessary, the
relevant knowledge and technology in this sector might be less mobile across borders than in
manufacturing industries. Thus I expect the results for the manufacturing to be similar to those
in the mobile industry, whereas the service sector should display similar patterns as the non-
mobile sector. Table 13 gives the results for this alternative classiﬁcation. The results are in line
with expectations, as in the manufacturing sector, the coefﬁcients resemble the high intangibles
industry results except that exporters display a signiﬁcant productivity advantage in this case.
The estimates of the service industries correspond to the industry where less mobile capabilities
dominate. None of the t-tests on the pairwise equality of the coefﬁcients can be rejected, though.
Finally, I also use data on R&D and advertising intensity to explicitly take into account
the suggestions by Nocke & Yeaple (2007). I use the data from Peneder (2002), who presents
ﬁgures for industry R&D and advertising expenditures over sales for the US economy at the
three-digit NACE level, based on the assumption that the US economy serves as a useful point
of reference for its technological leadership. This comes at the cost of restricting the sample to
the manufacturing sector only. The results for industries classiﬁed into those with low and high
R&D and advertising ratios are shown in table 14 and 15, respectively.12 The acquirers display
the largest and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient both in the ‘High R&D intensity’ and ‘High advertising
intensity’ estimation, while the respective coefﬁcient is rather close to zero and not signiﬁcant
at any reasonable level in the remaining columns. Thus, at least for manufacturing industries,
the distinction of the underlying type of intangible asset seems to be less relevant. The chosen
classiﬁcation referring to the importance of intangible assets within an industry seems to be
robust towards a ﬁner differentiation. As intangible assets can be transfered and employed at
different ﬁrms at the same time, they seem to be a good operationalization of the concept of
mobile capabilities.
12A simultaneous classiﬁcation into high advertising/low R&D and high R&D/low advertising is not
possible, as the low number of ones for cross-border deals does not lead to any signiﬁcant results.
166 Conclusion
In this paper, the empirical literature on the determinants of international activity at the ﬁrm
level is extended towards different modes of FDI. While several empirical studies conﬁrm a
productivity ranking based on Helpman et al. (2004), this paper shows that these results hold
only on average for all types of FDI and over all industries. In line with Nocke & Yeaple (2007),
it matters whether MNEs engage abroad via greenﬁeld investments or cross-border acquisitions.
Splitting MNEs into acquirers of foreign ﬁrms and ﬁrms that build a new ﬁrm abroad reveals that
in the U.K., acquirers in a cross-border deal are the most productive ﬁrms in industries where
intangible assets are high relative to non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets, but they are the least productive
group of all international active ﬁrms in the complementary low intangibles industry group.
Exporters and ﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld investments display a productivity advantage over
domestic ﬁrms of similar size in both industries. Whether the higher intangibles stem from
higher R&D efforts or from higher marketing expenses seems not to be of primary importance,
at least for manufacturing industries. It is shown that these results are not an artifact of the
speciﬁc dataset as results comparable to the existing literature on MNEs can be produced. It
should be taken into account that the motives for ﬁrms choosing different internationalization
forms potentially differ across industries and thus the effects of trade liberalization might vary
across industries as well.
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21Table 1
Examples for the industry classification – NACE two-digit codes.
Low intangibles industries
17 Manuf. of textiles
21 Manuf. of pulp, paper and paper products
25 Manuf. of rubber and plastic products
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
70 Real estate activities
High intangibles industries
16 Manuf. of tobacco products
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
24 Manuf. of chemicals, chemical products and man-made ﬁbres
33 Manuf. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
52 Retail trade
73 Research and Development
The complete list of NACE codes of the high intangibles category: 16, 22, 23, 24, 90, 33, 34, 41, 52, 55,
73. The remaining industries fall in the low intangibles category.
22Table 2
Share of firms in the estimation sample according to their internation-




Firms > 10 employees 17.2




Firms > 10 employees 2.7




Firms with more than 10 employees 0.12




Firms with more than 10 employees 1.0
Manufacturing ﬁrms > 10 employees 1.7
23Table 3
Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample.
Domestic Cross-border greenﬁeld
ﬁrms Exporters acquirers investors
United Kingdom
Log sales 7.867 9.334 10.369 10.323
Log employment 3.045 3.985 5.052 4.861
Log TFP 0.826 1.475 1.580 1.701
Share of intangibles 0.051 0.075 0.166 0.106
N (ﬁrm-year observations) 174,275 60,546 548 3,733
Unconditional means. Calculations are based on the period of entering the respective status and include
up to three years after entrance via the respective internationalization mode. TFP: Olley & Pakes
(1996) algorithm. Share of intangibles: intangible assets over non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets.
24Table 4
Heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
classification: industry share of intangible assets.
Low intangibles High intangibles
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.072*** -0.003
(0.012) (0.032)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.003 0.443***
(0.073) (0.118)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.131*** 0.001
(0.025) (0.044)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer 0.069 -0.446***
(0.075) (0.121)
Future exporter = Future greenﬁeld -0.059** -0.004
(0.027) (0.056)
Future acquirer = Future greenﬁeld -0.128 0.442***
(0.079) (0.123)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adj.R-squared 0.467 0.553
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. ***, **,
* denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log
number of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder
dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenﬁeld
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in
parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-
cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment
dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy
coeﬃcient. Sectors are classiﬁed according to their mean share of intangible assets over non-ﬁnancial
ﬁxed assets. High intangibles industries are the top quartile of all industries ranked by their respective
mean share.
25Figure 2
Cumulative distribution functions of the firms’ productivity by foreign









Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future MNE -0.044*
(0.025)
Past international activity Yes
Control variables Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes
N 249,014
adj.R 0.478
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. ***, **, *
denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number
of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder dummy,
legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter and MNE dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE
industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting
dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-FDI dummy coeﬃcient.
27Table 6
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries – Only con-
trolling for year and industry.
Low intangibles High intangibles
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.292*** 0.106***
(0.013) (0.036)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.287*** 0.671***
(0.085) (0.147)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.459*** 0.291***
(0.028) (0.053)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer 0.005 -0.565***
(0.086) (0.150)
Future exporter = Future greenﬁeld -0.167*** -0.185***
(0.031) (0.066)
Future acquirer = Future greenﬁeld -0.172* 0.380**
(0.090) (0.158)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables No No
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adj.R-squared 0.184 0.261
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. ***, **,
* denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: exporter, post-cross-border deal
and post-greenﬁeld investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is
equal to pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld
investment dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld
investment dummy coeﬃcient.
28Table 7
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries – Only do-
mestic firms.
Low intangibles High intangibles
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.073*** -0.023
(0.013) (0.040)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.010 0.380***
(0.076) (0.115)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.142*** 0.010
(0.028) (0.051)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer 0.062 -0.403***
(0.078) (0.122)
Future exporter = Future greenﬁeld -0.069** -0.033
(0.031) (0.067)
Future acquirer = Future greenﬁeld -0.132 0.370***
(0.083) (0.123)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 181,298 31,278
adj.R-squared 0.472 0.545
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. ***, **,
* denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log
number of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder
dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenﬁeld
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in
parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-
cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment
dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy
coeﬃcient. Sample excluding ﬁrms with a foreign majority shareholder.
29Table 8
Heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Labor productivity.
Low intangibles High intangibles
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.240*** 0.093**
(0.013) (0.037)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.161* 0.581***
(0.083) (0.153)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.313*** 0.118**
(0.027) (0.051)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer 0.078 -0.488***
(0.084) (0.155)
Future exporter = Future greenﬁeld -0.074** -0.025
(0.031) (0.064)
Future acquirer = Future greenﬁeld -0.152* 0.463***
(0.089) (0.162)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adj.R-squared 0.174 0.259
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with log labor productivity as the dependent variable. ***, **,
* denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log
number of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder
dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenﬁeld
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in
parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-
cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment
dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy
coeﬃcient. Sectors are classiﬁed according to their mean share of intangible assets over non-ﬁnancial
ﬁxed assets. High intangibles industries are the top quartile of all industries ranked by their respective
mean share.
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Heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Productivity estimation with OLS.
Low intangibles High intangibles
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.214*** 0.090**
(0.013) (0.038)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.115 0.526***
(0.080) (0.160)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.246*** 0.046
(0.027) (0.051)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer 0.099 -0.436***
(0.081) (0.162)
Future exporter = Future greenﬁeld -0.032 0.044
(0.031) (0.064)
Future acquirer = Future greenﬁeld -0.132 0.479***
(0.171) (0.277)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adj.R-squared 0.400 0.503
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with the residual from a OLS productivity estimation as the de-
pendent variable. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log
number of employees, log number of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age,
foreign majority shareholder dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border
deal and post-greenﬁeld investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies.
Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is
equal to pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld
investment dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld invest-
ment dummy coeﬃcient. Sectors are classiﬁed according to their mean share of intangible assets over
non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets. High intangibles industries are the top quartile of all industries ranked by
their respective mean share.
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Heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Productivity estimation with fixed effects.
Low intangibles High intangibles
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.342*** 0.126***
(0.014) (0.038)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.405*** 0.745***
(0.088) (0.153)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.590*** 0.440***
(0.029) (0.059)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer -0.064 -0.619***
(0.089) (0.156)
Future exporter = Future greenﬁeld -0.249*** -0.315***
(0.032) (0.071)
Future acquirer = Future greenﬁeld -0.185** 0.304*
(0.094) (0.166)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adj.R-squared 0.186 0.252
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with the residual from a productivity estimation including ﬁxed
eﬀects as the dependent variable. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control
variables: exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenﬁeld investment dummies, and a set of time
and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hy-
pothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting
dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy
coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy coeﬃcient. Sectors are classiﬁed according to
their mean share of intangible assets over non-ﬁnancial ﬁxed assets. High intangibles industries are the
top quartile of all industries ranked by their respective mean share.
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Heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Alternative exporter definition.
Low intangibles High intangibles
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future exporting ﬁrm 0.086*** 0.052
(0.014) (0.034)
Future cross-border acquirer -0.004 0.424***
(0.074) (0.125)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.120*** -0.019
(0.025) (0.045)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer 0.090 -0.372***
(0.075) (0.130)
Future exporter = Future greenﬁeld -0.033** 0.071*
(0.028) (0.058)
Future acquirer = Future greenﬁeld -0.124* 0.443
(0.079) (0.130)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 212,767 36,247
adj.R-squared 0.468 0.555
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. Exporter
dummy equals one if ﬁrm starts to export within the next three years. ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance
levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenﬁeld
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in
parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-
cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment
dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy
coeﬃcient. Sectors are classiﬁed according to their mean share of intangible assets over non-ﬁnancial
ﬁxed assets. High intangibles industries are the top quartile of all industries ranked by their respective
mean share.
33Table 12
Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Interaction with industry share of intangible assets.
𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.105***
(0.036)
Future cross-border acquirer -0.354*
(0.190)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.130**
(0.063)
Future export expanding ﬁrm -0.817
*mean R&D (0.678)
Future cross-border acquirer 8.325**
*mean R&D (3.470)
Future Greenﬁeld investor -0.377
*mean R&D (1.070)
Past international activity Yes
Control variables Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes
N 249,014
adj.R-squared 0.478
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. ***, **,
* denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log
number of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder
dummy. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypotheses pre-internationalization
dummy coeﬃcient and interaction term coeﬃcient jointly equal to zero.
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Table 5: Considering heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries –
Manufacturing and service industries.
Services Manufacturing
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.075*** 0.039***
(0.016) (0.014)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.009 0.176**
(0.089) (0.077)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.141*** 0.035
(0.030) (0.028)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer 0.066 -0.137*
(0.091) (0.078)
Future exporter = Future greenﬁeld -0.066* 0.004
(0.034) (0.032)
Future acquirer = Future greenﬁeld -0.133 0.141*
(0.096) (0.082)
Past international activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 195,193 53,821
adj.R-squared 0.488 0.417
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. ***, **,
* denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log
number of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder
dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenﬁeld
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in
parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-
cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment
dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy
coeﬃcient. Manufacturing industries: two-digit NACE codes 15-37.
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Heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries – R&D intensity (man-
ufacturing only).
Low R&D High R&D
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.059*** -0.006
(0.016) (0.027)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.006 0.318***
(0.090) (0.111)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.055* -0.004
(0.031) (0.050)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer 0.053 -0.324***
(0.092) (0.114)
Future exporter = Future Greenﬁeld 0.003 -0.002
(0.035) (0.058)
Future acquirer = Future Greenﬁeld -0.049 0.321***
(0.097) (0.119)
Past intern. activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 37,490 15,940
adj.R-squared 0.434 0.394
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. ***, **,
* denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log
number of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder
dummy, legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenﬁeld
investment dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in
parentheses. Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-
cross-border dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment
dummy coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy
coeﬃcient. Manufacturing industries: two-digit NACE codes 15-37.
36Table 15
Heterogeneity across modes of FDI and industries – Advertising intensity
(manufacturing only).
Low advertising High advertising
𝗽 (SE) 𝗽 (SE)
Estimated coeﬃcients
Future export expanding ﬁrm 0.011 0.135***
(0.016) (0.031)
Future cross-border acquirer 0.039 0.452***
(0.071) (0.153)
Future Greenﬁeld investor 0.015 0.089*
(0.033) (0.050)
Test of equality of coeﬃcients
Future exporter = Future Acquirer -0.028 -0.317**
(0.073) (0.156)
Future exporter = Future Greenﬁeld -0.004 0.046
(0.037) (0.058)
Future acquirer = Future Greenﬁeld 0.023 0.364**
(0.081) (0.158)
Past intern. activity Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes
Industry and time eﬀects Yes Yes
N 38,311 15,119
adj.R-squared 0.402 0.470
Coeﬃcients from an OLS regression with Olley & Pakes log TFP as the dependent variable. ***, **, *
denote signiﬁcance levels 1, 5, 10%, respectively. Control variables: log number of employees, log number
of employees squared, log average wage, log age, squared log age, foreign majority shareholder dummy,
legal form dummy, log capital stock, exporter, post-cross-border deal and post-greenﬁeld investment
dummies, and a set of time and two-digit NACE industry dummies. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-sided t-test with null hypothesis pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-cross-border
dummy coeﬃcient, pre-exporting dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy
coeﬃcient, and pre-cross-border dummy coeﬃcient is equal to pre-greenﬁeld investment dummy
coeﬃcient. Manufacturing industries: two-digit NACE codes 15-37.
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